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IN THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS 
P. H. INVESTMENT, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
CATHY OLIVER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Casje No. 870501-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(1) and §78-4-11. This is 
an appeal from a decision by the Honorrable Robert C. Gibson of 
the Fifth Circuit Court in an eviction case. 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Whether Defendant is entitled to a rent rebate to 
compensate her for Plaintiff's failure to comply with Salt Lake 
City housing ordinances and Plaintiff's breach of its implied 
warranty of habitability. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. §78-36-3 to 10; Salt Lake City Ordinanc-
es §5-11-1. 
STATEMENT OF TH^ CASE 
This is an unlawful detainer action by a landlord 
against a tenant based upon non-paymeht of rent. The landlord's 
complaint sought a writ of restitution and a judgment for rent 
owed and damages based upon Utah Code Ann. §78-36-3 to 10. 
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The case was tried to the Honorable Robert C. Gibson 
who granted judgment to landlord against tenant in the sum of 
$80.36 for rent from February 1, 1987, through February 9, 1987, 
for treble damages in the sum of $630.00 from February 10, 1987, 
through March 6, 1987, and for costs of court of $19.35, together 
with an Order of Restitution of the premises. Tenant received an 
offset of $200.00 against this judgment representing her deposit 
(R. 54, T. 59). The court dismissed tenant's rent rebate coun-
terclaim. 
Testimony given by William Cupid, a Housing Officer 
with Salt Lake City Building and Housing Services, indicated that 
there were numerous violations of the Uniform Housing Code and 
the Uniform Code for the Abatement of Dangerous Buildings, 
including electrical violations, a hazardous narrow stairway 
without handrails, holes in the walls, tilted and rotted floors, 
boarded-up windows, and an illegally built shed with a collapsed 
roof (T. 30-33). Mr. Cupid further testified that the building 
was substandard and dangerous (T. 33). Tenant argued that based 
on the warranty of habitability no rent was due and owing and she 
was entitled to a rent rebate because the condition of the house 
did not meet the standards set by Salt Lake City Ordinances, 
namely the Uniform Housing Code and the Uniform Code for the 
Abatement of Dangerous Buildings, §5-11-1 (R. 5-6). 
The Court gave three reasons for refusing any rent 
offset to tenant: 
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1. The court should not interfere in the contractual 
arrangement entered into by tenant and landlord. 
2. A tenant is not entitled to any rent offset for 
landlord's breach of an implied warranty of 
habitability because the Utah Supreme Court has 
never delineated such a cause of action. 
3. Appellant waived any defense or cause of action 
under a theory of warranty of habitability by 
agreeing to rent the premises in their deteriorat-
ed condition (R. 4 7, T, 59). 
The matter now comes before this court for determina-
tion of whether a warranty of habitability is implied in a rental 
agreement,, and if the breach thereof constitutes a defense to an 
unlawful detainer action and justifies a rent offset or rebate to 
tenant. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The vast majority of states has adopted the implied 
warranty of habitability and has allowed it as a defense in 
unlawful detainer actions. This Court take the final step in 
establishing this doctrine in Utah and award tenant a rent rebate 
to compensate for landlord's breach of this warranty. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY, ADOPTED IN MOST 
STATES, SHOULD BE JUDICIALLY ADOPTED IN UTAH. 
The trial court decided this case by simply looking at 
the agreement between the parties and defendant's admitted 
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failure to pay rent. The court gave no legal significance to the 
testimony regarding the condition of the premises. By refusing 
to consider defendant's basis for non-payment, the court erred. 
The court should have applied an equitable offset to the rent 
based on a warranty of habitability, considered the analysis of 
recent Utah Supreme Court eases regarding landlords1 obligations 
and considered plaintifff s failure to live up to those obliga-
tions. 
The basis for the lower court's opinion was apparently 
application of the doctrine of caveat emptor which has been 
universally rejected as no longer reflecting the realities 
underlying the landlord/tenant relationship in modern society. 
Instead, the majority of states has turned to the implied warran-
ty of habitability in order to better reflect the relationship 
between landlord and tenant in modern society. 
A warranty of habitability has three elements. The 
first is that the warranty exists by implication in all residen-
tial landlord/tenant agreements to the effect that the premises 
are fit for its intended use -- human occupancy, which is fre-
quently measured by compliance with housing and health codes. 
The second element is that the warranty is mutually dependent 
upon the tenant's covenant to pay rent. The third is that the 
breach of the warranty by the landlord justifies the tenant in 
suspending the payment of rent. In turn, the breach of warranty 
is a defense to an action by a landlord for non-payment of rent. 
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The existence of a warranty of habitability derives 
historically from combining principles of property, contract, and 
tort law, as developed below. It prevails in a majority of 
jurisdictions in this country today. 
A. The Historical Basis for Applying Caveat Emptor No 
Longer Exists in Modern Society. 
Courts adopting the implied warranty of habitability 
inevitably begin with a discussion of the anachronism of the 
caveat emptor doctrine in today's society. The U. S. Court of 
Appeals for the D. C. Circuit wrote in Javins v. First National 
Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970), 
Since, in traditional analysis, a lease was 
the conveyance of an interest in land, courts 
have usually utilized the special rules 
governing real property transactions to 
resolve controversies involving leases. 
However, as the Supreme Court has noted in 
another context, the body of private property 
law ..., more than almost any other branch of 
law, has been shaped by distinctions whose 
validity is largely historical. (footnote 
omitted). Courts have a duty to reappraise 
old doctrines in the light of the facts and 
values of contemporary life - particularly 
old common law doctrines which the courts 
themselves created and developed. 
The history of the landlord's maintenance duties 
returns us to the Norman Conquest, when the land was divided into 
great estates ruled by lords. With the advent of the landlord's 
Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment by 1500 came the creation of a new 
See Boyle, The Landlord's Warranty of Habitability; A 
Plea for Statutory Reform, 1984 Florida Bar J. 509. 
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social institution - the landlord/tenant relationship. The chief 
duty of the landlord was a negative one: "to keep his overseer 
away from the premises while the tenant had the right to occupy 
2 
and farm the land." This negative covenant of non-interference 
changed to an affirmative duty in the 19th century with the 
change of life occasioned by the Industrial Revolution. In 
Edwards v. Etherington, 171 Eng.Rep. 1016 (1825), the courts 
introduced the concept of an affirmative duty to see to structur-
al repairs of the leased premises. A series of cases expanded 
3 
this new concept. The result was a continued development of an 
inference of a warranty of habitability in the residential 
landlord/tenant relationship until the Housing Act of 1925, which 
provided statutorily for an implied warranty of habitability in 
the lease of every residence in London, the rent for which did 
not exceed forty pounds. 
American courts, unfortunately, followed the common law 
in England only up to the 18th century. Although England pro-
gressed, the United States1 courts continued to insulate the 
landlord from liability. It was not until the 1970fs that courts 
Id. at 509. 
3 
See Collins v. Barrow, 174 Eng. Rep. 38 (1831) (tenant 
held justified in abandoning leased dwellings that suffered from 
lack of proper drainage); Smith v. Marrable, 152 Eng. Rep. 693 
(1843) ("in point of law every house must be taken to be let upon 
the implied condition that there was nothing about it so noxious 
as to render it uninhabitable.") 
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were willing to look beyond the frozen doctrine of caveat emptor 
associated with agrarian England. 
Four factors influenced courts in shedding the old 
baggage. First, courts began to recognize the changed needs of 
the modern urban dweller. One of the first courts to recognize 
the need for change, the Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit, 
noted that ff[w]hen American city dwellers ...seek 'shelter' 
today, they seek a well known package bf goods and services - a 
package which includes ...adequate heat, light and ventilation, 
serviceable plumbing facilities, securp windows and doors, proper 
sanitation, and proper maintenance." Javins, 428 F.2d at 1074. 
This emphasis on services makes the doctrine of caveat emptor 
unconvincing. 
Second, the lack of adequate1 housing has caused unequal 
bargaining positions, leaving tenants With little leverage to 
enforce a request for improved housing conditions. "In reality, 
the tenant is placed in a ' take-it-or-tleave-it' position which 
forces him to sign a form lease providing him with no protection 
4 
and allowing the landlord to reap the benefits of the bargain." 
Third, the agrarian doctrine assumed the equal footing 
of the landlord and the tenant. Each had equal knowledge of the 
land. In modern society, it is the lahdlord who has the superior 
knowledge and financial capability wit)i regard to the condition 
Note, The Implied Warranty of Habitability: A Dream 
Deferred, 48 UMKC L.Rev. 237, 240 (1980). 
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and repair of the leased premises. The Florida Supreme Court 
noted that "we now live in an age where the complexities of 
housing construction place the landlord in a much better position 
to guard against dangerous conditions." Mansur v. Eubanks, 401 
So.2d 1328, 1330 (Fla. 1981). 
Fourth, courts have analogized the landlord/tenant 
relationship to the sales contract theory of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code. The Missouri appellate court observed that the 
tenant's lack of knowledge of the true condition of the leased 
premises rendered him just as vulnerable as if he had purchased 
an automobile. King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 73 (Mo. App. 
1973). 
Modern courts, recognizing these factors, have aban-
doned the outmoded doctrine of law based on agrarian reality, and 
have adopted implied warranties of habitability. 
An oft-cited court, the Court of Appeals for the D. C. 
Circuit in Javins, 428 F.2d at 1072-3, denied relief in a land-
lord's action for possession based on non-payment of rent on the 
ground that a warranty of housing code compliance was implied by 
law into all leases. This court noted its duty to "reappraise 
old doctrines in the light of the facts and values of contempo-
rary life," and concluded that "old rules of property law govern-
ing leases are inappropriate for today's transactions." 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Pines v. Perssion, 14 
Wis.2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409, 412-13 (1961) also pointedly remarked 
that "[t]he need and social desirability of adequate housing for 
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people in this era of rapid population, increases is too important 
to be rebuffed by that obnoxious cliche, caveat emptor* Permit-
ting landlords to rent 'tumbledown' houses is at least a contrib-
uting cause of such problems as urban blight, juvenile delinquen-
cy and high property taxes for conscientious landowners." 
More recently, the Vermont Supreme Court in Helder v. 
St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202, 207 (1984) asserted that "[i]n light of 
these changes in the relationship between tenants and landlords, 
it would be wrong for the law to continue to impose the doctrine 
of caveat lessee on residential leases." And the Florida Supreme 
Court, in an opinion construing a statutory imposition of the 
warranty of habitability in Mansur v. [Eubanks, 401 So.2d at 1330, 
stated that "[w]e do not believe there are sufficient reasons to 
continue to completely insulate the landlord from liability." 
Courts in twenty jurisdictions have echoed the state-
ments of the courts cited above. 
B. This Court Should Follow the Lead of Hall v. Warren and 
Declare An Implied Warranty pf Habitability in Utah. 
The Utah Supreme Court has taken a major step in the 
direction of an implied warranty of habitability in Utah. In 
Hall v. Warren, 632 P.2d 848 (Utah 1981) (Hall I) and Hall v. 
Warren, 692 P.2d 737 (Utah 1984) (Hall II), the Utah Supreme 
Court addressed the issue of landlord liability for a tenant's 
injuries due to a faulty furnace. In gall, the tenants rented a 
house in Vernal, Utah, under a month-"co-month oral agreement. 
The house had a floor furnace that the plaintiffs did not use 
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until three years later. When used, it produced gases that 
asphyxiated the plaintiffs, requiring emergency medical treat-
ment. The tenants brought suit against the landlord alleging 
negligence, breach of implied warranty of habitability, and 
strict liability. The court in Hall I reversed the award of 
summary judgment in favor of defendants and remanded the case for 
trial, holding that "a landlord may be subject to a duty of care 
imposed by a statute or ordinance. Thus, pertinent safety 
standards established by Vernal City's building code are consid-
ered as much a part of a lease as if expressly stated in the 
contract." Hall II at 738. The Supreme Court declined to decide 
the case based on the theory of warranty of habitability due to 
11
 the abbreviated briefing of [this] issue." Hall I at 851. 
The Hall I court based its decision on the fact that "a 
landlord may be subject to a duty of care imposed by a statute or 
ordinance." Hall I at 850. This reasoning signals an acceptance 
of the modern view that leases are to be treated as contracts 
rather than land conveyances. Thus, the court held that 
"[p]ertinent safety standards established by the Code are consid-
ered as much a part of a lease as if expressed in contract." Id. 
This is the same reasoning as is used by other courts that have 
adopted an implied warranty of habitability in residential 
5 
leases. And indeed, the Hall court cited Javins and Steele v. 
5 
See, e.g., Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 
(Footnote Continued) 
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Latimer, warranty of habitability casejs, to support the statement 
that housing code standards are incorporated into the lease. 
Although the Supreme Court dfLd not address the issue of 
an implied warranty of habitability in Hall I and II, it went a 
long way towards acceptance of such a jioctrine by its recognition 
that landlords do have obligations to tenants, and that, as other 
courts who have adopted the implied warranty of habitability have 
found, any applicable housing codes are made a part of the 
leasing contract. There is in Utah after Hall I and II, an 
implied warranty of habitability in everything but name. It is a 
small step for this Court to establish an implied warranty of 
habitability in all residential leases. 
C. The Majority of States Today Recognize an Implied 
Warranty of Habitability, Either Statutorily or Judi-
cially Imposed. 
Appellant is not asking this Court to do anything that 
is out of line with landlord/tenant lato in the United States 
today. It is Utah which is presently out of step with the 
majority of states in its enunciation of landlord/tenant law. 
At least forty-three states have adopted the implied 
warranty of habitability, either statutorily, judicially, or 
(Footnote Continued) 
1071, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Glyco v. Schultz, 289 N.E.2d 919, 
925 (Sylvania, Ohio Mun. Ct. 1972); Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 
329, 521 P.2d 304, 309-310 (1974). 
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both. Of these states, the judiciary initiated acceptance of 
the doctrine in twenty jurisdictions. 
Much of this activity by courts was premised on a 
reevaluation of the court-made doctrine of caveat emptor. As the 
court stated in Foisy v. Wyman, 515 P.2d 160, 163 (Wash. 1973): 
"Through the United States, the old rule of caveat emptor in the 
leasing of premises has been undergoing judicial scrutiny." 
(Emphasis added) The California Supreme Court in Green v. 
Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco, 111 
Cal.Rptr. 704, 517 P.2d 1168 (1974) traced the origin of the 
implied warranty of habitability to court decisions before the 
turn of the century, such as Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 
N.E. 286 (1892), and explained its decision as "a logical devel-
opment of the common law principles embodied in the Ingalls 
decision. 517 P.2d at 1174 n.ll. Finally the Green court 
observed that it was following the lead of seven other state 
supreme courts and numerous other courts in adopting the warranty 
of habitability. A few courts have rejected this analysis, 
including Colorado. The Colorado Supreme Court, in Blackwell v. 
Del Bosco, 558 P.2d 563, 565 (Colo. 1976), stated that 
See Appendix A for complete list of states which recognize 
the doctrine of implied warranty of habitability. 
7 
See case citations in Appendix A for California, D. C , 
Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and 
Wisconsin. 
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We have carefully considered the emerging 
warranty remedy recognized i[n these [courts 
declaring the existence of ah implied warran-
ty] opinions. We have concluded that however 
desirable the adoption of th^ rule of implied 
warranty of habitability might be, the 
resolution of this issue is pnore properly the 
function of the General Assembly. The 
implied warranty of habitability theory 
involves many economic and social complexi-
ties, and we believe its adoption should be 
preceded by the research and[study of which 
the legislature is more capable. Embracing 
the theory might, for examplp, cause land-
lords to significantly raise rents in order 
to make the required repairs, or induce them 
to abandon already run-down premises, leaving 
some poor people without anvfplace, good or 
bad, in which to live. 
The Colorado court's decision to defer to the legislature is not 
mandated by the facts, particularly now - twelve years later. 
The research and study the court suggests has been completed and 
g 
documented in various studies. The concerns of the Colorado 
9 
court, echoed by others opposing the warranty, are illusory. 
The Heskin study, which surveyed California courts, for example 
determined that 
8 
See, e.g., Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on 
Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and 
Income Redistribution Policy, 80 Yale |L.J. 1093 (1971); Heskin, 
The Warranty of Habitability Debate: ^ California Case Study, 66 
Calif.L.Rev. 37 (1978). 
9
 See Recent Developments, 1982 Utah L.Rev. 703, 708 for an 
enunciation of the possible concerns. ("Increasing the 
landlord's potential liabilities, however, may cause them to 
abandon older, low-income properties, which are likely to violate 
the codes. That result would diminish the supply of housing 
available to groups that most need the protection afforded by the 
codes.") 
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1. Green is being employed more often and 
violations of the warranty occur less 
often than assumed. 
2. The use of the warranty does not affect 
the housing market. 
3. The warranty is leading to the repair of 
property and could assist code enforce-
ment if knowledge of it spreads. 
4. Tenants who remain in possession do not 
have their rents substantially raised. 
5. Most tenants or their lawyers are not 
inclined to abuse the law. 
Heskin, The Warranty of Habitability Debate at 67. 
Assuming that a court's concerns about inadequate data 
are alleviated by studies such as the one above, a court might 
still be concerned with speaking where the legislature has not 
spoken. However, in Utah, local governmental units have adopted 
building, housing and health codes and thus broadened landlord 
responsibilities. This policy statement should embolden a 
reluctant court considering an implied warranty of habitability. 
The existence of a housing code has, in fact, been considered a 
mandate by at least one court: 
The legislature has made a policy judgment -
that it is socially (and politically) desir-
able to impose these duties on a property 
owner - which has rendered the old common-law 
rule obsolete. To follow the old rule of no 
implied warranty of habitability in leases 
would, in our opinion, be inconsistent with 
the current legislative policy concerning 
housing standards. 
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Pines v. Perssion/ 111 N.W.2d at 417, 
This is also true in Utah, since Hall, where the Utah 
Supreme Court defined the landlord's auty based on building 
codes. It is actually the Colorado court's dissent which is in 
line with the majority of courts in this country. The dissent 
stated: 
I do not believe that an outworn common law 
doctrine should be retained in the law of 
this state in the hope that the legislature 
will act in that area. Had the legislature 
acted in whatever way, I would, of course, 
recognize and adhere to their power in that 
area. But, in the absence of their action in 
the field, I think it wrong to rely, as I 
said on an outmoded common l&w doctrine. The 
strength of the common law aXways was its 
responsiveness to the changina needs of 
society. 
Blackwell, 558 P.2d at 566 (dissenting opinion). 
This Court should follow the majority ^f jurisdictions declaring 
the existence of an implied warranty o% habitability in residen-
tial leases and disregard those few, mostly rural southern 
states, which, for reasons no longer relevant, decline to join 
their more enlightened sister states iji the much needed progress 
out of the agrarian age. 
10 
Accord, Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114, 122 (W.Va. 
1978). 
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POINT II 
THE TENANTfS DUTY TO PAY RENT IS DEPENDENT 
UPON THE LANDLORD'S PERFORMANCE OF HIS 
IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY AND THE 
LANDLORD'S BREACH OF THIS WARRANTY MAY BE 
RAISED AS A DEFENSE TO AN UNLAWFUL DETAINER 
ACTION BASED ON NON-PAYMENT OF RENT. 
The modern view favors a new approach which recognizes 
that a lease is essentially a contract between the landlord and 
the tenant wherein the landlord promises to deliver and maintain 
the premises in habitable condition and the tenant promises to 
pay rent for such habitable premises. These promises constitute 
interdependent and mutual considerations. Thus, the tenant's 
obligation to pay rent is predicated on the landlord's obligation 
to deliver and maintain the premises in habitable condition. 
The significance of this new framework for apportion-
ment of landlord/tenant responsibilities and establishing depen-
dent covenants is that all the remedies for breach of contract 
are available to the tenant. The failure of the landlord to 
supply a habitable rental unit amounts to a failure of considera-
tion thereby breaching the contract and justifying rent abate-
ment. The Massachusetts Supreme Court succinctly stated this in 
Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 843 (Mass. 
1973) (footnotes omitted): 
Since we hold that the tenant's covenant to 
pay rent is dependent on the landlord's 
implied warranty of habitability, there is no 
need for a constructive eviction defense to 
justify the tenant's decision to stop paying 
rent. 'The doctrine of constructive evic-
tion, as an admitted judicial fiction,...no 
longer serves its [purpose] when the more 
flexible concept of implied warranty of 
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habitability and fitness is legally avail-
able. f Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 434, 
462 P.2d 470, 471 (1969). 
Thus, instead of pleadihg constructive 
eviction as a defense to a landlord's action 
to recover rent, the tenant has recourse to 
...contractual rights and remedies afforded 
by the warranty of habitability. 
Logically then, the tenant whose landlord fails to 
maintain the premises in a habitable condition should be able to 
rescind the contract without incurring liability for rent, deduct 
the costs necessary to make the dwelling habitable (repair and 
deduct), bring an action for damages (Retroactive rent abatement) 
to be measured by the difference in value between the reasonable 
rental value of the uninhabitable dwelling and the contractual 
rental rate, bring an action for specific performance to compel 
the landlord to provide that which was bargained for, or withhold 
rent and raise the landlord's breach ih defense to an action for 
summary dispossession. 
The Javins court held that the landlord's duty to 
comply with the housing code and the tenant's duty to pay rent 
are mutually dependent. 
Under contract principles...the tenant's 
obligation to pay rent is dependent upon the 
landlord's performance of hi£ obligations, 
including his warranty to maintain the 
premises in habitable condition. In order to 
determine whether any rent i$ owed to the 
landlord, the tenants must bfe given an oppor-
tunity to prove the housing Code violations 
alleged as breach of the landlord's warranty. 
Javins, 428 F.2d at 1082 (footnote omitted). 
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In Utah, the only remedies available to the tenant have 
been constructive eviction and housing code enforcement by 
municipal building inspectors• But these remedies are inadequate 
and impractical for several reasons. 
The constructive eviction defense is an impractical 
remedy in that it requires the tenant to vacate the premises. 
This is a very burdensome requirement especially in today's 
housing market. The vacancy rate overall in low cost housing is 
very low and low income persons are those most often subjected to 
uninhabitable conditions. Therefore, the tenant would most 
likely find himself/herself in an equally dilapidated dwelling 
upon moving. 
Housing code enforcement is far from effective as the 
Javins court noted. The ineffectiveness of this method stems 
from the court's unwillingness to recognize housing violations as 
crimes and impose fines, and when they do, they are often minimal 
and simply treated as a cost of doing business. And if the 
inspection results in a condemnation, the tenant is again sub-
jected to the problem of finding another adequate and affordable 
dwelling. A presidential commission reported that inadequate 
enforcement has led to 
...thousands of landlords in disadvantaged 
neighborhoods openly violating building codes 
with impunity, thereby providing a constant 
demonstration of flagrant discrimination by 
Gribetz and Grad, Housing Code Enforcement; Sanctions 
and Remedies, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 1254, 1279 (1966). 
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legal authorities,..[I]n most cities, few 
building code violations are corrected, even 
when tenants complain directly to municipal 
building departments...[T]he open violation 
of codes [acts] as a constant source of 
distress to low-income tenants and creates 
serious hazards to health aqd^safety in 
disadvantaged neighborhoods. 
The warranty of habitability defense goes to the very 
essence of the dispute in an action fdr unlawful detainer for 
non-payment of rent. If the warranty is substantially breached, 
the tenant's obligation is reduced. When demand for the rent 
owed is made, the amount of the demand is inaccurate and in 
excess of the tenant's obligation. Tl^ e lack of effective reme-
dies for the tenant has no doubt led to the current situation of 
large numbers of dilapidated dwellings and units in substantial 
violation of the housing codes. For these reasons, this court 
should recognize breach of the warranty of habitability as a 
defense, partial or total, to an unlawful detainer action based 
on non-payment of rent. 
POINT III 
THE LANDLORD MAY NOT ASSERT AN AFFIRMATIVE 
DEFENSE OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK ON THE PART OF 
THE TENANT TO DEFEAT LANDLORD'S LIABILITY 
UNDER THE WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY DOCTRINE. 
Most courts hold that the warranty of habitability is 
applicable from the outset even when the tenant enters into the 
Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil 
Disorders, 472 (Bantam ed., 1968). 
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lease agreement with knowledge of adverse conditions in the 
13 dwelling. This result is only logical. 
The Supreme Court of California in Knight v. 
Hallsthammar, 171 Cal.Rptr. 707, 623 P.2d 268, 273 (1981), 
addressed this issue directly: 
...the fact that a tenant was or was not 
aware of specific defects is not determina-
tive of the duty of a landlord to maintain 
premises which are habitable. The same 
reasons which imply the existence of the 
warranty of habitability - the ineguality of 
bargaining power, the shortage of housing, 
and the impracticability of imposing upon 
tenants a duty of inspection - also compel 
the conclusion that a tenant's lack of 
knowledge of defects is not a prerequisite to 
the landlord's breach of the warranty. 
The opinion there also rejected, as inconsistent with Green, any 
duty on the tenant to inspect for defects which may render the 
premises uninhabitable and reversed a jury instruction which 
barred the warranty defense for failure to inspect. Id. at 273 
n. 5. Thus, the trial court's determination that any cause of 
action under a theory of warranty of habitability was waived (T. 
59) misstates the law and public policy and should be overturned. 
CONCLUSION 
Tenant sought a rebate of her rent based on landlord's 
failure to comply with applicable building and housing codes. 
See e.g. King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 75 (Mo.App. 
1973); Glyco v. Schultz, 289 N.E.2d 919, 925 (Sylvania Mun. Ct. 
1972); Foisy v. Wyman, 515 P.2d 160, 164 (Wash. 1973); Boston 
Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 843 (Mass. 1973). 
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Uncontroverted evidence showed the existence of numerous code 
violations. These codes are a part of the lease between the 
parties by operation of law. This coutt should articulate the 
manner in which tenants can recover for landlordf s breach of 
their implied warranty of habitability and provide guidance to 
lower courts in considering this defense to non-payment in 
eviction cases. 
DATED this 14th day of March, 1988. 
UTAH LpGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
B^UCE PLENK 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 14th day of March, 1988, 
I mailed four true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellant to James H. Deans, Attorney for Respondent, 175 South 
Main, Suite 500, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, 
VJL 
- 21 -
APPENDIX A 
STATES WHICH RECOGNIZE THE DOCTRINE OF 
IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY 
Judicially Adopted: 
California: 
District of 
Columbia: 
Georgia: 
Hawaii: 
Illinois: 
Indiana: 
Iowa: 
Kansas: 
Massachusetts: 
Michigan: 
Missouri: 
New Hampshire: 
Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal.3d 616, 517 
P.2d 1168 (1974); and Cal. Civ. Code, §§1941, 
1942 (West 1974) 
Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 
F.2d 1071 (D. C. Cir.), cert, denied, 400 
U.S. 925 (1970) 
Gevens v. Gray, 126 Ga. App. 309, 190 S.E.2d 
607 (1972); and Ga. Code Ann., §47-7-13 
(19 ) _ 1 
Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 
(1969); and Haw. Rev. Stat., §521-42 (Supp. 
1974) 
Jack Spring, Inc. y. Little, 50 111.2d 351, 
280 N.E.2d 208 (1972) (limited to existence 
of municipal builqing code) Extended to all 
leases regardless of codes by Glasoe v. 
Trinkle, 479 N.E.2d 915 (111. 1985) 
Old Town Development Co. v. Langford, 349 
N.E.2d 744 (Ind.A^p. 1976) 
Mease v. Fox, 200 
Code Ann. §562 A ( 
N.W.2d 791 (1972); and Iowa 
West 1979) 
Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304 
(1974) codified in| Kan. Stat. Ann. 
§58-2553(a) (1975) 
Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 363 
Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973); and Mass. 
Gen. Laws Ann., ct^ . 239, §8A (West Supp. 
1974) 
Rome v. Walker, 38 Mich. App. 458, 196 N.W.2d 
850 (1972)Mich. Cotap. Laws Ann., §554.139 
(West Supp. 1974) 
King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo.Ct.App. 
1973) [residential only] 
Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 
(1971) 
A - 1 
Kentucky: 
Maine: 
Maryland: 
Minnesota: 
Montana: 
Nebraska: 
Nevada: 
New Mexico: 
New York: 
North Carolina: 
North Dakota: 
Oklahoma: 
Oregon: 
Rhode Island: 
South Carolina: 
Ky. Rev. Stat. §§383.5000 to 383.715 (1974) 
(URLTA adopted) 
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., tit. 14, §6021 (1980 and 
Supp. 1983-1984) 
Md. Real Prop. Code Ann., §8-211 (Cum. Supp. 
1975), superceded in their respective juris-
dictions by Baltimore City Public Local Laws, 
§§9-9, 9-10, 9-14.1 (eff. July 1, 1971), and 
Montgomery County Code, Fair Landlord-Tenant 
Relations ch. 93A (Nov. 21, 1972) 
Minn. Stat. Ann., §504.18 (West 1971), 
applied in Fritz v. Warthen, 298 Minn. 54, 
213 N.W.2d 339 (1973) 
Mont. Code Ann., §§42-420 and 42-426 (1977) 
Neb. Rev. Stat., §§76-1419, 76-1425, et seq. 
(Cum. Supp. 1974) 
Nev. Rev. Stat., §118A.290 (1970) 
(but note that the act does not protect 
tenants whose landlord owns fewer than seven 
units) 
N.M. Stat. Ann., §§70-7-1 (1975) and N.M. 
Stat. Ann. §§47-8-1 to -51 (1978) (URLTA 
adopted) 
N.Y. Real Prop. Law, §§235-b (McKinney 1975) 
N.C. Gen. Stat. §42-42(a)(l) (1984) 
N.D. Cent. Code, §47-16-13.1 (1977) 
Okla. Stat. Ann., tit. 41, §118 (West 1978) 
Or. Rev. Stat., §§91.770, 91.800-.815 (1974) 
(URLTA adopted); L & M Investment Co. v. 
Morrison, 286 Or. 397, 594 P.2d 1238 (1979), 
upholding and interpreting habitability 
sections of statute. 
R.I. Gen. Laws §§34-18-1 to -56 (1987) (URLTA 
adopted) 
S.C. Code Ann. §27-40-440 (Law 
Co-op.Cum.Supp. 1987) 
A - 3 
New Jersey: 
Ohio: 
Pennsylvania: 
Texas: 
Vermont: 
Washington: 
West Virginia: 
Wisconsin: 
Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 
(1970) 
Glyco v. Schultz, 35 Ohio Misc. 25, 289 
N.E.2d 919 (Sylvania Mun.Ct. 1972); and Ohio 
Rev. Code Ann. §§5321.04, 5321.07 (Page Supp. 
1974) 
Pugh v. Holmes, 405 A.2d 897 (Pa. 1979); 
[also Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, 
Inc., 329 A.2d 812 (Pa. 1974)] 
Kamarath v. Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. 
1978); and Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 92.052 
(Vernon 1984) 
Birkenhead v. Coombs, 465 A.2d 244 (Vt. 1983) 
Wash. Rev. Code Ann>; §59.18 (Supp. 1974) 
requires tenant to be current in rent to 
exercise remedies enacted after judicial 
implication of warranty of habitability in 
Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash.2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 
(1973) (en banc) 
Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114 (W.Va. 1978); 
and W.Va. Code §37-6-30 (1978) (sets out 
landlord obligations but does not provide 
remedy for breach) 
Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis.2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 
409 (1961); but see, Posnanski v. Hood, 46 
Wis.2d 172, 174 N.W.2d 528 (1970). 
Legislatively Adopted: 
Alaska: 
Arizona: 
Connecticut: 
Delaware: 
Florida: 
Alaska Stat., §§34.03.100, 34.03.160, 
34.03.180 (1974) 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ahn., §§33-1324, 1361 (1974) 
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann., §§47-24b (West 1960); 
and LeClair v. Woodward, 6 Conn.Cir. 727, 316 
A.2d 791 (1970) 
Del. Code Ann., tit. 25, §5303 (1974) 
Fla. Stat. Ann., §§83.51, 83.56 (West 1973) 
based on Mease v. Fox, Mansur v. Eubanks, 401 
So.2d 1328 (Fla. 1981) construing the statute 
Idaho: Idaho Code, §6-320 
A - 2 
Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann., §§53-5501 (Cum. Supp. 1974) 
(applies to major cities only) 
Virginia: Va. Code Ann., §§55-248.2 to -248.40 (Cum. 
Supp. 1975) (URLTA adopted) 
NOTE: URLTA, the Uniform Residential Landlord Tenant Act, 
includes a warranty of habitability at Sections 2.14 and 4.105. 
No Warranty of Habitability 
Alabama 
Arkansas 
Colorado 
Louisiana 
Mississippi 
South Dakota 
Utah 
Wyoming 
A - 4 
ADDENDUM 
Chapter 11 
HOUSING 
Sections: 
5-11-1. Uniform Housing Code and Uniform Code for the Abatement of 
Dangerous Buildings adopted. 
5-11-2. Governing body. 
5-11-3. Housing inspection fees. 
5-11-4. Housing Advisory and Appeals Board. 
5-11-5. Conduct of hearing appeals. 
5-11-6. Performance of abatement work. 
5-11-7. Recovery of cost of repair or demolition. 
5-11-8. Conditional permit for temporary securing. 
5-11-9. Public nuisance and administrative review. 
Sec. 5-11-1. Uniform Housing Code and Uniform Code for the Abatement 
of Dangerous Buildings adopted. The Uniform Housing Code, 1982 edition, 
hereinafter sometimes referred to 4s "UHC", and the Uniform Code for the 
Abatement of Dangerous Buildings, 1982 edition, hereinafter sometimes 
referred to as "UCADB", are hereby adopted by Salt Lake City as the 
ordinances, rules, and regulations of said City, subject to the amendments and 
exceptions thereto as hereinafter s t^ out; three copies of said codes shall be 
filed for use and examination by the public in the office of the City Recorder of 
Salt Lake City. The purpose of these codes is to provide minimum 
requirements for the protection of life, limb, health, property, safety, and 
welfare of the general public and the owners and occupants of buildings within 
Salt Lake City and providing for correction of violations thereof. Hereafter all 
references in the revised ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah 1965, to the 
Uniform Housing Code and Uniform Code for the Abatement of Dangerous 
Buildings, 1976 editions adopted by Section 5-11-1 are amended and deemed 
to read the Uniform Housing Code, 1982 edition and Uniform Code for the 
Abatement of Dangerous Buildings, 1982 edition. 
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ADDENDUM 1 - 1 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
BY: BRUCE PLENK #2613 
124 South 400 East, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-8891 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
P. H. INVESTMENT, * 
* FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, * CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
* 
vs. * 
CATHY OLIVER, * 
* Civil No. 873-2236CV 
Defendant. * 
* 
The above-entitled action came on regularly for trial on the 
5th day of March, 1987, the Honorable Robert C. Gibson presiding. 
Plaintiff appeared by its agent Stan Secor and by counsel James 
H. Deans. Defendant appeared in person and by counsel Bruce 
Plenk of Utah Legal Services, Inc. The court having heard 
arguments and testimony, considered the evidence and good cause 
appearing, now enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The court has jurisdiction over the parties and subject 
matter of this action. 
2. Plaintiff is the owner of real property located at 224 
Iowa Street, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah. 
ADDENDUM 2-1 
3. Plaintiff is the successor in interest to the rental 
agreement entered into between Rainier Huck and defendant. 
4. Defendant rented the premises on or about November 1, 
1986, and at that time the premises were in a dangerous and 
deteriorated condition which was never repaired by Plaintiff's 
initial landlord, Rainier Huck, or by Plaintiff. Defendant 
testified that the condition of the premises at the time of trial 
was as bad as the condition on November 1, 1986. 
5. Defendant has failed to pay the monthly rental for 
February, 1987. 
6. Defendant was served a 3-Day Notice to Pay Rent or 
Vacate on or about February 6, 1987. 
7. Defendant is currently occupying the premises in 
unlawful detainer. 
8. There is no document in evidence that would allow for 
an award of attorney's fees to either party. 
9. Defendant called as a witness Mr. William Cupit, an 
enforcement officer with nine years1 experience employed by the 
Salt Lake City Building and Housing Services who testified that 
he inspected the premises on February 19, 1987, and at that time 
there were 42 violations of the Uniform Housing Code and the 
Uniform Code for the Abatement of Dangerous Buildings, both of 
which have been incorporated into the ordinances of Salt Lake 
City. Mr. Cupit testified that on the date of his inspection and 
for a lengthy period of time before that day the building was 
substandard and dangerous, a public nuisance and subject to 
abatement by repair, rehabilitation or demolition. 
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10. Mr. Cupit testified that he would close the building to 
occupancy if it were vacant and that he advised the Defendant to 
attempt to relocate. He further testified that on March 3, 1987, 
he sent formal notice to Plaintiff to repair or demolish the 
building. 
11. Defendant testified that when she rented the building 
she was not aware of the extent and nature of the code violations 
and that she could not afford other housing nor could she now 
afford to move. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The court will not interfere in the contractual ar-
rangement entered into by defendant and plaintiff's assignor. 
2. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against Defendant in 
the sum of $80.36 for rent from February 1, 1987, through Febru-
ary 9, 1987, and for treble damages in the sum of $630.00 from 
February 10, 1987, through March 6, 1987, and for costs of court 
of $19.35, together with an Order of Restitution for the premis-
es. Defendant is to receive an offset of $200.00 against this 
judgment representing her deposit. 
3. Defendant's counterclaim should be dismissed with 
prejudice. 
4. Defendant is not entitled to any offset against rent 
which she owes based on her defense of a breach of an implied 
warranty of habitability by Plaintiff nor is she entitled to 
recover any damages for Plaintiff's beach of an implied warranty 
of habitability because the Supreme Court of this state has never 
delineated such a defense or cause of action. 
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ADDENDUM 2-3 
5. Defendant has waived any ddfense or cause of action 
under a theory of warranty of habitai^ility by her agreeing to 
rent the premises in their deteriorated condition. 
DATED this / T day of / t Z ^ & ^ O 1987. 
ROBERT C. GIBSON 
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was mailed 
first class to James H. Deans, Attorney for Plaintiff, 175 
South Main, Suite 500, Salt Lake. City, Utah 84111. 
DATED this day of *Zu riZftdf-t*-*' . 1987. 
bp/oliver.fin 
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UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
BY: BRUCE PLENK #2613 
124 South 400 East, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-8891 
CIRCUIT COURT, Sxaxri OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
P. H. INVESTMENT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CATHY OLIVER, 
Defendant. 
The above-entitled action came on regularly for trial the 
5th day of March, 1987, the Honorable Robert C. Gibson presiding 
and plaintiff appearing by its agent Stan Secor and by counsel 
James H. Deans and defendant appearing in person and by counsel 
Bruce Plenk and the court having entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and good cause appearing, now, 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT: 
1. Possession of the premises at 224 Iowa Street, Salt 
Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah, be delivered to the plaintiff, 
and that the defendant and the defendant's property (and all 
persons claiming a right to occupancy through defendant) be 
removed from the premises. All rights to occupancy through 
defendant arising from the Rental Agreement are terminated, and 
* 
* CORRECTED JUDGMENT 
* 
* 
* Civil No. 873-2236CV 
* 
ADDENDUM 3-1 
the Sheriff or Constable is directed to execute this judgment 
immediately. 
2. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against Defendant in 
the sum of $80.36 for rent from February 1, 1987, through Febru-
ary 9, 1987, and for treble damages in the sum of $630.00 from 
February 10, 1987, through March 6, 1987, and for costs of court 
of $19.35, together with an Order of Restitution for the premis-
es. Defendant is to receive an offset of $200.00 against this 
judgment representing her deposit. Plaintiff is thus awarded 
judgment of $529.71. 
3. Defendant's Counterclaim is dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this / 6 day of / ^ ^ ^ ^ v 1987. 
ROBERT C. GIBSON*-^ ^ ^ 
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING\. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the forego-
ing CORRECTED JUDGMENT was mailed first class to James H. Deans, 
Attorney for Plaintiff, 175 South Main, Suite 500, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111. ^ 
DATED this <P2> day of L / C & ^ l / . 1987. 
bp/oliver.jud 
